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TIME AND CHANGE IN JUDGE-MADE LAW: 
CONVERGENCE, DIVISIONS OF  
AUTHORITY, AND THE  
RESTATEMENT 
Michael L. Wells* 
INTRODUCTION 
In his contribution to Wake Forest Law School’s 2009 
Symposium on the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Professor Kenneth 
Abraham starts with two propositions, one descriptive, the other 
normative.  The descriptive claim is that “tort law . . . is mature and 
largely stable,”1 and  that “[o]ver time, the law of different states 
will converge.”2  As  he points out, “The formation of the American 
Law Institute (“ALI”) itself, and the project of restating the law that 
the ALI . . . undertook” depends on these premises.3 
The project of restating the law also depends on a normative 
premise, namely that  “mov[ing] that process along” is a worthy 
goal.4  The idea that the private law should be the same in all fifty 
states certainly seems preferable to anyone who has coped with the 
difficulties of working with variations among states on issues of tort 
law.  Convergence not only avoids arbitrary differences in the way 
similarly situated litigants are treated, but also offers a solution to 
the many practical difficulties that arise when a given transaction 
crosses state lines.  In any event, adherence to this norm may be a 
matter of existential necessity for the ALI.  Otherwise, one is hard 
put to justify the resources that are expended in producing the 
Restatements.  The descriptive and normative claims are related in 
that the value of moving the process along is greater or lesser 
depending on how successful the project is likely to be. 
Whether Professor Abraham subscribes to these propositions is 
not entirely clear from his article.  Since his project was to identify 
“stable divisions of authority” within the tort system, the premise of 
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unity serves merely to highlight those divisions.5  My aim here is not 
to find fault with anything in his article, but rather to examine the 
notion that tort law does and should move toward unity.  For 
convenience, I will call these descriptive and normative claims the 
“convergence thesis.” 
Professor Abraham’s article addresses a problem for the 
descriptive side of this thesis.  He acknowledges that “[t]here 
are . . . areas of doctrine over which the states have what seems to 
be permanent or at least long-term disagreement.”6  For the most 
part, he argues, these areas can be pigeonholed into three 
categories: “(1) developmental dead ends, (2) fundamental clashes of 
values, and (3) concerns about consistency of administration.”7  If I 
understand Professor Abraham correctly, his point is that areas of 
disagreement do not necessarily pose a challenge to the general 
tendency toward convergence.  But Abraham seems to assure us 
that the divisions are discrete, limited, and themselves “stable.”  His 
point is well taken, for no general description of a system as large 
and complex as American private law can hope to account for its 
every feature.  Nonetheless, in this Article, I will raise questions 
about both the descriptive and normative claims of the convergence 
thesis. 
I.  TRANSFORMATIONS IN TORT LAW 
As a description of tort doctrine, the notion that there is a basic 
unity across the states—except for a few stable divisions of 
authority on matters like market-share liability and the treatment 
of trespassers—seems to me to be correct over the very short term.  
Over longer periods of time, however, tort law is more dynamic than 
Professor Abraham’s description suggests.  Rather than being 
“stable divisions of authority,” large areas of tort law are 
transformed, sometimes in subtle ways, and sometimes radically.  
Compare, for example, the contents of the second edition of the 
Gregory and Kalven casebook, published in 1969,8 with the ninth 
edition of the book, now edited by Richard Epstein and published in 
2008.9  Gregory and Kalven begin their casebook with causation, and 
the book contains no materials at all on either market-share liability 
or “increased risk,” theories of causation that have taken hold in 
some courts in the interim.10  The 1969 edition of the Gregory and 
Kalven casebook was published a few years after the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts first addressed products liability in 1965.11 Most of 
the cases deal with privity, the warranty-tort distinction, and the 
economic loss rule that obliges some litigants to sue in contract 
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rather than tort.12  Current casebooks contain extensive treatments 
of design defect, the duty to warn, the plaintiff’s conduct, federal 
preemption, and other matters.13  These do not appear in the earlier 
edition of the book for the very good reason that none of these cases 
had been decided.  On the treatment of trespassers, the earlier book 
notes the “recent California case, Rowland v. Christian” for the 
proposition that the older rule “may now be in the process of 
change.”14  The more recent edition includes Rowland as a main case 
and surveys the mixed reception the case received in the intervening 
four decades.15  The Gregory and Kalven casebook includes a long 
chapter entitled “Ultimate Policy Issues” devoted mainly to no-fault 
schemes that would replace or supplement tort remedies with first-
party insurance.16  This idea was fashionable at the time, and New 
Zealand actually adopted such a scheme in 1972.17  But no-fault 
schemes fell out of favor in the forty years between the publication 
of the two books.  Epstein’s chapter on policy focuses on specific 
insurance schemes, primarily workers’ compensation and no-fault 
car insurance.18  The “tort reform” movement, which has generally 
involved state-by-state legislation, has produced another set of 
variations among jurisdictions.19 
One could go on, but these examples will suffice for my 
purposes.  Indeed, noting the changes in tort law over the past forty 
years may seem not only to belabor the obvious, but also to miss 
Abraham’s point.  The ALI pays close attention to changes over 
time.  Those changes are the main reason for drafting the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts in the 1960s, and a third one today.  
Defenders of the convergence thesis would no doubt charge that by 
noting changes in the law over time I have mixed apples and 
oranges.  It is clear that Professor Abraham means to refer to 
convergence at a given point in time and does not mean to deny that 
tort law changes significantly over time.  Given the extent of change 
over time, Abraham must mean to assert that change over time is 
different from, and compatible with, convergence at any given point 
in time. 
But the distinction between change over time and variation at a 
given point in time is not as sharp as defenders of convergence may 
imagine it to be.  One reason is that in a system of private law that 
includes over fifty jurisdictions, each of them is sovereign over the 
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matters of general tort law covered by the various Restatements.20  
In matters of common law, change comes to each state at a different 
pace. Change over time begins with one jurisdiction deciding to 
break with precedent, as the California Supreme Court did in 
Rowland with respect to landowner liability.  But other jurisdictions 
do not then consider the issue simultaneously or even in the same 
legislative session, and then either adopt it or not.  Rather, changes 
over time occur at an uneven pace from one jurisdiction to another.  
Their courts take up the issue periodically over the ensuing decades, 
depending on whether and when an appropriate case raises it.  Even 
if the issue is one as to which the law ultimately does “work[] itself 
pure”21—as landowner liability does not—most of the time the law 
will differ from one place to another. 
In addition, judicial opinions can be unclear on whether any 
change has taken place on a given matter and the substance of 
whatever change that may have occurred.  Consider the design-
defect issue discussed by Abraham.22  In one view, the Georgia 
Supreme Court has endorsed the “reasonable alternative design” 
test of the Restatement (Third) on products liability.23  But the case 
also says that “[u]nder Georgia law, the proper analysis in a design 
defect case is to balance the risks inherent in a product design 
against the utility of the product so designed,”24 and refers to the 
court’s previous “adoption of the risk-utility analysis” in its leading 
decision on the topic.25  A prudent lawyer would conclude that 
exactly what Georgia has done remains an open question, though it 
surely has rejected the “consumer expectations” test that Abraham 
discusses.26 
If all of the “changes in tort doctrine over time” had already 
been set in motion by, say, August 1, 2010, the process of change as 
it moves from one jurisdiction to another would be a temporary 
problem for the convergence thesis.  But no one would endorse that 
premise, as it is wholly unrealistic to suppose that the political, 
social, technological, and cultural factors that produce changes in 
the common law have now come to an end.  Perhaps Professor 
Abraham means to predict that the only political, social, 
technological, and cultural changes that will affect tort law going 
forward are discrete ones that will lead to more examples of the 
narrow and “stable divisions of authority” that he identifies.  
Lacking a crystal ball, I cannot disprove that prediction, but I would 
suggest that it is ahistorical and implausible.  Someone making a 
 
 20. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 21. Abraham, supra note 1, at 963 (quoting Omychund v. Barker, (1744) 26 
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 25. Id. at 103 (citing Banks v. ICI Ams., 450 S.E.2d 671, 674 (Ga. 1994)). 
 26. Abraham, supra note 1, at 969–70. 
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similar prediction about products liability in 1970 would have been 
proven wrong by the exponential growth of products law that began 
in that decade.  Nor did anyone foresee the growth of mass tort 
litigation and the doctrinal innovations it would spawn.27  
Developments of similar scope surely await us, and with them will 
come less convergence, followed by sporadic, uncertain, and 
incomplete moves toward unity, followed by more innovations and 
renewed disparity. The ALI will continue to struggle to keep up. 
II.  THE BENEFITS OF CONVERGENCE IN TORT LAW 
The descriptive question raised by the plausible “at a given 
moment in time” version of the convergence thesis is not binary, but 
rather a matter of degree—not whether there is convergence at a 
given moment in time, but how much convergence we have attained. 
Answering this question is not just a matter of counting up doctrines 
and splits of authority.  It necessarily has a qualitative aspect: one 
must ask whether the areas in which courts disagree are especially 
significant or not.  Reasonable people can differ about the answer. 
The more interesting question for me is the normative one: 
should we make an effort to achieve greater convergence, through 
Restatements and other means?  The first point that needs to be 
made about this question is that our system of private law is not a 
unitary one in which the Supreme Court of the United States 
exercises final authority over all tort law.  In such a system, the case 
for promoting convergence would be compelling.  Allowing variations 
within a system to persist indefinitely would be intolerable, as 
persons governed by the same set of legal rules would be treated 
differently.  At the time of the first Restatement of Torts in the 
1930s,28 it was possible to conceive of our system in this way, or to 
imagine it moving in this direction, for the federal courts were free, 
under Swift v. Tyson,29 to follow common law rules of their own 
choosing.  But “the benefits expected to flow from the rule did not 
accrue,”30 and the Court eventually overruled Swift in Erie R.R. Co. 
v. Tompkins.31  Rather than opting for a unitary body of private law, 
Erie signaled that our federal system treats the great bulk of private 
law, including torts, as state law.32  Erie not only put to rest Swift’s 
futile dream of a nationally uniform common law but also declared 
that “there is no federal general common law.”33 
After Erie, arguments for and against convergence boil down to 
the costs and benefits of variety versus unity in the common law. 
 
 27. Many of these innovations are examined in RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, THE 
LAW OF CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER AGGREGATE LITIGATION (2009). 
 28. See 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1939); 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1938); 2 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: NEGLIGENCE (1934); 1 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: 
INTENTIONAL HARMS TO PERSONS, LANDS, AND CHATTELS (1934). 
 29. 41 U.S. 1, 19 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 
64 (1938). 
 30. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74. 
 31. Id. at 79–80. 
 32. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 
54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 504–05 (1954). 
 33. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
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Variations among states certainly add a layer of complexity and 
uncertainty to business planning and to litigation that crosses state 
lines, as issues may arise as to which state’s law applies to a given 
issue.  A whole body of law on “conflicts of law,” itself important 
enough to warrant a law school course on the topic, addresses those 
issues.  Litigants who seem to be similarly situated may be treated 
differently on account of the operation of conflicts principles.34 
Convergence would lessen the incidence of that kind of unfairness. 
A quite distinct argument for convergence concentrates on the 
quality of the rules themselves.  It is plausible to believe that a 
centralized decision maker, like the ALI, will construct better rules 
than a myriad of state courts.  The ALI has access to all of the 
decisions of all of the state courts, as well as the expertise of leading 
judges, lawyers, and academics.  The Reporters and Advisory 
Committees can take their time and are obliged to shed their 
partisan concerns.  Under these conditions, issues can be addressed 
deliberately, disinterestedly, and free from the distractions of 
litigation.35  The aim of improving the law through Restatements can 
only be achieved to the extent courts everywhere endorse 
convergence and follow the Restatement formulation of the doctrine. 
Consider, for example, Professor Abraham’s discussion of the diverse 
views among states concerning trespasser liability.36  One 
implication of the “superior rule maker” argument for convergence is 
that the forty-one states that have rejected the Restatement 
(Second)’s rule on trespassers should change their law, just because 
a superior decision maker has made a different choice.  As for 
Professor Abraham, his discussion of the topic carefully avoids 
taking sides. 
On the other hand, an array of arguments can be marshaled on 
the opposing side: 
•  One is entitled to doubt the superior wisdom of the ALI 
 
 34. For example, suppose that a North Carolina resident and a Georgia 
resident are both driving while texting and collide on a roadway somewhere.  
Each sues the other for negligence and each raises a contributory negligence 
defense.  Both are found negligent as defendants and contributorily negligent as 
plaintiffs.  Assume that under the conflicts rule of the jurisdiction where the 
suits are brought the plaintiff’s fault is governed by his residency.  The result is 
that the Georgian will have his recovery reduced under Georgia’s comparative 
negligence rule, while the North Carolinian will recover nothing under North 
Carolina’s absolute defense.  See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-33(a) (2010) (“Where an 
action is brought against one or more persons for injury to person or property 
and the plaintiff is to some degree responsible for the injury or damages 
claimed, the trier of fact, in its determination of the total amount of damages to 
be awarded, if any, shall determine the percentage of fault of the plaintiff and 
the judge shall reduce the amount of damages otherwise awarded to the 
plaintiff in proportion to his or her percentage of fault.”); Sorrells v. M.Y.B. 
Hospitality Ventures of Asheville, 332 N.C. 645, 648, 423 S.E.2d 72, 73–74 
(1992) (holding that a finding of contributory negligence bars recovery from a 
defendant for acts of ordinary negligence). 
 35. See Catharine Pierce Wells, A Pragmatic Approach to Improving Tort 
Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1447, 1448 (2001) (describing the aspirations of the ALI 
as it undertook the process of restating the law). 
 36. See Abraham, supra note 1, at 967–68. 
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Reporters and Advisory Committees.  Some have charged that 
the drafting of modern Restatements may place an 
“extraordinary burden” on the participants “of reconciling the 
demands of law and politics.”37 
•  Even if political compromises can be avoided, it is 
reasonable to think that calm and detachment are not 
necessarily virtues.  Better rules may be made in the heat of 
conflict, under pressure to reach conclusions that have 
significant impact on real litigants. 
•  Variations among jurisdictions permit us to test the impact 
of one rule compared to another over time and better evaluate 
its quality. 
•  In a big country, the social and cultural underpinnings of 
tort law may differ from one place to another.  The nonflagrant 
trespasser may be viewed as a more serious problem in a rural 
state than an urban one, such that a “no recovery” rule is 
appropriate in the former while the Restatement (Third)’s 
formulation is appropriate for the latter. 
•  The federal structure of our system of government reflects a 
preference for localized over centralized decision making on 
matters that neither the Constitution nor Congress have 
addressed.  The point of Erie was not merely to do away with 
Swift.  Granting that there is a case for convergence, Erie 
reflects the value that our federal system places on the 
benefits of variety over those of unity. 
•  In a centralized system, one cannot easily avoid a rule one 
finds repugnant.  When the issue is governed by state law, one 
can move away. 
For my part, this latter set of arguments carries the day.  While 
the case for convergence has merit, I distrust the general notion that 
centralized rule making works better than law making dispersed 
over a large and culturally diverse nation like the United States.  
With regards to tort law in particular, it is, as it was eighty years 
ago, “one of the most dynamic fields of government.”38  It seems to 
me unwise to aim for convergence in such an area, even if that aim 
could be achieved. 
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